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Abstract: This paper examines the roles of information and knowledge sharing, 
and of communication in businesses during the interwar period and during 
World War II (WWII). It focuses on F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. (Roche), a Swiss 
pharmaceutical company. During WWII, the Axis Powers and the Allies im-
posed a double blockade on Switzerland and Roche’s market was divided be-
tween the two belligerent camps. Roche coped by mobilizing a unique twin-
structure, a provision introduced during the interwar period, by transforming 
the ownership structure in terms of both ownership and control. While this 
strategy enabled its expansion in the U.S. market and safeguarded the group 
against various political risks, it also destabilized the group’s unity. As intensive 
as it may have been, telecommunication across the Atlantic was not sufficient 
for sharing crucial knowledge and checking the U.S. subsidiary’s thirst for in-
dependence. To control the situation, the financial director of Roche’s Basel 
headquarters travelled to the United States, breaking the double blockade. 
Eventually, the on-site, face-to-face communication and a long-distance tele-
phone call contributed to the survival of the company as a unified organization. 
JEL-Codes: N 40, N 44, N 80, N 84 
Keywords: information, knowledge, communication, multinational enterprise, 
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1  Introduction 
The multinational enterprise (MNE), one of the most important actors of globali-
zation, originated before World War I (WWI) and developed in environments 
that had relatively few constraints imposed by sovereign states. The main ob-
|| 
*Takafumi Kurosawa, Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Sakyo-Ku, Yoshida  
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stacles to information exchange and communication were physical distance and 
technological conditions rather than political ones.  
However, nationalism and the two world wars created new difficulties for 
multinational enterprises – communication in and out of these organizations 
was impaired by battlefronts and blockades. Furthermore, this new threat was 
closely linked to fatal risks for MNEs during the world wars, such as boycott, 
restraints on transactions involving foreign exchange, economic sanctions and 
blacklisting, asset freeze, loss of control over subsidiaries, and in some extreme 
cases, confiscation of subsidiaries and even of the parent company itself. Or-
ganizational capabilities to cope with these difficulties became decisive factors 
for the competitiveness and survival of MNEs. Some of the MNEs from Switzer-
land and other neutral countries enhanced their position in this process.1  
In order to address these political risks, a sizable number of MNEs built up a 
complicated ownership and control structure for their businesses.2 However, it 
quite often involved the risk of weakening the grip on their subsidiaries and 
sometimes even led to the dismantlement of the whole group. The introduction 
of a complex company structure meant that the information and knowledge 
about the company became crucial and delicate elements for the survival of the 
company. Wartime communication among group companies was often affected 
by external, non-economic factors. This paper analyzes the challenges in infor-
mation and knowledge transfer and communication in a multinational com-
pany which had to address political risks. 
This paper focuses on the case of F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. (since 1919, 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG., hereinafter Roche), a pharmaceutical company 
|| 
1–G. Jones/H.G. Schröter, The Rise of Multinationals in Continental Europe, Aldershot 1993; G. 
Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, 
Oxford 2005, pp. 81-83, 243-244. 
2–For a discussion of general political risk and its impacts on international businesses, see H. 
James/T. Jakob (Eds.), Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe, Aldershot 2002; G. Jones, 
Control, Performance, and Knowledge Transfers in Large Multinationals. Unilever in the United 
States, 1945-1980, in: Business History Review 76/3, 2002, pp. 435-476; C. Kobrak/P. Hansen 
(Eds.), European Business, Dictatorship, and Political Risk, 1920-1945, New York 2004. For a 
discussion of the scheme of trust and holding structures, see M. Lüpold, Globalisierung als 
Krisenreaktionsstrategie. Dezentralisierung und Renationalisierung bei Nestlé 1920-1950, in: 
H.-J. Gilomen/M. Müller/B.Veyrassat (Eds.), Globalisierung-Chancen und Risiken. Die Schweiz 
in der Weltwirtschaft 18.-20. Jahrhundert/La globalisation-chances et risques. La Suisse dans 
l’economie mondiale 18e-20e siècles, Zurich 2003, pp. 211-234; B. Wubs, International Business 
and National War Interests. Unilever between Reich and Empire, 1939-1945, London 2008; G. 
Jones/C. Lubinski, Managing Political Risk in Global Business. Beiersdorf 1914-1990, in: Enter-
prise & Society 13/1, 2012, pp. 85-119.  
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based in Basel. Founded in 1896, Roche was an MNE since inception, with its 
headquarters in proximity to Alsace and its first main factory in Germany (Gren-
zach) across the national border. With subsidiaries and agencies in 35 countries, 
it had become Europe’s second largest pharmaceutical enterprise by 1929, next 
only to IG Farben.3 Roche expanded its business outside Europe during the in-
terwar period and during World War II (WWII), evolving from a European MNE 
to a truly global MNE. With the expanding U.S. market, the company faced a 
crisis caused by geopolitical distance, which threatened the unity of the group.  
Several studies have examined the difficulties faced by Swiss multination-
als located in the cross-border economic region during the two world wars and 
highlighted that these obstacles were overcome to a significant extent by geo-
graphical proximity.4 This paper focuses on the transfer of information and 
knowledge among the major actors in Roche, the constraints imposed by the 
double blockade, and the details of the communications between the two head-
quarters that were separated by the Atlantic.5 
|| 
3–H.C. Peyer, Roche. Geschichte eines Unternehmens 1896-1996 , Basel2 1996, p. 115. 
4–As regards WWI and the interwar period, Alexander L. Bieri, a curator at the Roche Histori-
cal Collection and Archive, has recently completed a study on the impact of WWI and na-
tionalism on Roche, focusing on its ownership and control structure. A.L. Bieri, Roche im Ers-
ten Weltkrieg. Die Genese einer globalen Unternehmensstruktur, in: Basler Zeitschrift für Ge-
schichte und Altertumskunde, forthcoming. Dr. Bieri has kindly provided the author with the 
proof. As regards WWII, see, for instance, an intensive study on Georg Fischer A.G., a manufac-
turer of cast plumbing products and joints, that describes how and the extent to which com-
munication across the Swiss-German border continued during WWII: H.U. Wipf, Georg Fischer 
A.G. 1930-1945: Ein Schweizer Industrieunternehmen im Spannungsfeld Europas, Zürich 2001. 
See also: L. Straumann/D. Wildmann, Schweizer Chemieunternehmen im “Dritten Reich”, Zurich 
2001; C. Ruch/M. Rais-Liechti/R. Peter, Geschäfte und Zwangsarbeit. Schweizer Industrieunter-
nehmen im “Dritten Reich”, Zurich 2001. For discussion related to Switzerland and the issue of 
knowledge during WWII, see: Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland - Second World 
War, Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second World War: Final Report, Zürich 2002 
(hereinafter ICE, Final Report). 
5–Roche’s twin structure is not discussed in detail in this paper; preliminary research results 
on this subject were presented in T. Kurosawa/B. Wubs, Comparing Organizational Change of 
Swiss and (Anglo)-Dutch Multinationals as a Result of the Two World Wars (EBHA-EBSJ Paris 
2012 Conference Paper), Paris 2012. Related publications (in Japanese) include the following: T. 
Kurosawa, Churitsukoku Suisu to Nachizumu. Dainiji Sekaitaisen to Rekishi Ninshiki [Neutral 
Switzerland and National Socialism: The Second World War and Perception of History], Kyoto 
2010; Idem, Dainiji-Taisen Nijyu-no Fusa to Churitsukoku Suisu no Takokuseki Kigyo [The 
World War, Nationalism and Organizational Structure of European Multinational Enterprises: 
The Twin Structure of Nestle, Roche and Unilever] in: The Kokumin-Keizai Zasshi [Journal of 
Economics & Business Administration] 202/5, 2010, pp. 1-21. 
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The second section of this paper presents the backdrop to the story: the im-
pact of and the lessons learned from WWI from the company’s perspective and 
the provisions made by the company to address political risks during the inter-
war period (2.1); the features of the double blockade imposed by the Allies and 
the Axis Powers on Switzerland and the motivations for this blockade (2.2); and 
the asymmetries between the Allies and the Axis Powers, and the background to 
the perceptions and actions of the various actors (2.3).  
The third section forms the core of this paper. We trace relevant historical 
events focusing on communication involving three main figures – Emil Barell, 
President of the Roche group, Alfred Fuchs, Financial Director of Roche’s head-
quarters in Basel, and Elmer H. Bobst, the General Director (later President) of 
Roche’s American subsidiary (Roche US) in Nutley. As financial director, Fuchs 
was the key person responsible for Roche’s group structure (i.e. ownership and 
control). He travelled to the United States twice, crossing the Atlantic during 
wartime and breaking the double blockade, to deal with the risk of the group’s 
dismantlement.  
Most of Fuchs’s perceptions and behaviours discussed in this study were re-
constructed from his unpublished autobiography,6 which by nature is subjec-
tive. However, the author verified most of his footprints, arguments, actions, 
and the logic behind them using other first-hand material preserved at the 
Roche Historical Archive. 
This paper aspires to answer the following questions: What kind of commu-
nication was maintained among the key actors during WWII? To what extent 
could they exchange their information and knowledge, and by what means and 
through which paths did they do so? What was the impact of the political uncer-
tainty and scarcity of information on their communication and behaviour? Why 
and when did they venture into direct, face-to-face communication by making 
risky trips across the Atlantic Ocean? To what extent were the political risks 
different from the non-political, economic ones? What kind of information 
asymmetry and knowledge asymmetry existed, and how were they rooted in the 
asymmetry of experience and expectation for the (desirable and undesirable) 
future? What was the role of trust among the major actors?  
|| 
6–Roche Historical Archive, Document Nr.PE.2. FUA 101483. Alfred J. Fuchs (1884-1968), Aus 
meinem Berufsleben. Vol. I and Vol. II, n.d. About this typewritten autobiography, Fuchs 
stated, “I started to write in 1953” (Vol. I, page 405); however, it is not known when and how 
the completed work was disclosed to others. Roche Historical Collections and Archive compiled 
a limited edition (printed and PDF versions) from the typewritten copy solely for in-house 
distribution, but the new version does not indicate page numbers. Consequently, I cite the 
typewritten version of the copy as “A. Fuchs, Aus meinem Berufsleben” hereinafter. 
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2  The Double Blockade:  
Swiss neutrality and challenges for Swiss MNEs 
2.1  Lessons learned from WWI and provisions during the 
interwar period 
In this section, we focus on individuals’ perceptions during the interwar period 
and WWII. Some of the perceptions and behaviour of individuals and organiza-
tions during WWII appear to be irrational when analysed today. A common 
explanation is that these people made their judgments based on their memories 
and experiences of WWI. This could also explain why some actors trusted or 
mistrusted others. Most of the key persons who made strategic decisions during 
WWII had experienced WWI at a young age; they went on to become leaders of 
the next generation.  
A brief description of the experiences of Roche during WWI and the provi-
sions it made after the end of the war help set the background for the discussion 
in this paper.7 Before the outbreak of WWI, Roche had established its biggest 
factory in Grenzach in German territory; this factory supplied materials and 
semi-finished products to Roche’s other factories. Both the Allies as well as the 
Central Powers were its main markets. Once the war broke out, the company 
suffered from a disruption of its supply chain and the communication between 
headquarters and subsidiaries. Moreover, Roche had to face a boycott campaign 
by local competitors in both camps; another setback was the arrest of Emil 
Barell (1874-1953), the director of its main factory in the German territory close 
to Basel, and his subsequent house arrest in Berlin. The company overcame 
these setbacks by making the headquarters in Basel neutral (i.e. any member of 
the management who was a national of any belligerent country was replaced by 
a Swiss national), expanding its production facilities in Basel, and legally lo-
calizing its foreign assets.  
The company faced the impending risk of bankruptcy in 1918/19 owing to 
difficulties during WWI and a sharp drop in its foreign currency asset value. In 
the midst of a serious liquidity crisis, Roche’s founder-owner, Fritz Hoffmann, 
(1868-1920) was forced by his brother-in-law and president of Basler Handels-
bank, Rudolf Albert Koechlin-Hoffmann, to reorganize the company as a joint 
|| 
7–Roche was established as a pharmaceutical manufacturer, not as a general chemical pro-
ducer, during the late 19th century; see Peyer, Roche, p. 35. 
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stock company, F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co., A.G.8 The following year, after the 
demise of Fritz Hoffmann, Barell assumed the role of Managing Director9. After 
the founder’s demise, and particularly after one of the founder’s sons sold his 
share to Barell in 1924, Barell became a power to contend with at Roche, as its 
Managing Director and a large shareholder.10 Although the ownership structure 
underwent slight modifications, throughout the interwar period and WWII, 
Roche’s shares were not listed on any stock exchange and were held by a lim-
ited number of shareholder groups.11  
During the 1920s, the company began to re-centralize gradually. However, 
the reconstruction of a stable world economic order failed. To cope with the 
collapse of the Doppel Reich, the segmentation of its market into the patchwork 
of territories of the newly-born nation states, and the double taxation on the 
parent company as well as its local subsidiaries, Roche introduced a special 
twin structure comprising of two holding companies – Roche and Sapac (de-
scribed in Section 2.1).  
Until recently, World War I had long remained a “forgotten economic 
war”.12 While it was a precursor to WWII in many ways, the experience of WWI 
differed significantly in each country.13 More to the point, WWII was not a repe-
|| 
8–Before this reorganization, Roche was a partnership company owned by members with 
unlimited liability and one with limited liability. Basler Handelsbank was Roche’s Hausbank or 
primary banker and Fritz Hoffmann’s major creditor; see Ibid, p. 74, pp. 77-81; A.L. Bieri, Roche 
im Ersten Weltkrieg. 
9–Emil Barell returned from Berlin to Basel after the WWI. He was an authoritarian leader of 
the company, who retained his position until right before his death; see Straumann/ Wildmann, 
Schweizer Chemieunternehmen, p. 186. 
10–Peyer, Roche, pp. 77-80. 
11–The company has always been regarded as a family-owned business by the Swiss public. 
Because all Roche shares were bearer shares at that time, it is not easy to get a reliable record 
of its ownership. However, A.L. Bieri elucidated that the ownership and the importance of the 
founder family can be categorized into several phases. Between the mid-1920s and mid-1930s, 
the proportion of shares held by the narrowly defined founder family was smaller than other 
period. At that time, Basler Handelsbank and a group of shareholders under Barell’s control 
had significant importance; see Beiri, Roche im Ersten Weltkrieg. 
12–R. Rossfeld/T. Straumann (Eds.), Der Vergessene Wirtschaftskrieg. Schweizer Unternehmen 
im Ersten Weltkrieg, Zürich 2008. 
13–The contrast between Belgium (which was occupied twice) and the Netherlands (which 
maintained neutrality during WWI) is an outstanding example. See: H. Klemann, Occupation 
and Industry. The Industrial Development in the Netherlands, 1940-1945, in: J. Lund (Ed.), Work-
ing for the New Order. European Business under German Domination, 1939-1945, Odense 2006, 
pp. 45-74; D. Luyten, The Belgian Economic Elite between Economy and Politics, in: Lund, Work-
ing for the New Order, pp. 75-92. 
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tition of WWI. Unlike the previous world war, WWII was very much expected, 
making it significantly different from WWI. The effects of this expectation and 
the preparation for the war were two-fold. For some actors, being prepared 
helped them to survive, but for others, it served as a lethal pitfall.  
2.2  New experience of WWII:  
Double blockade imposed on neutral Switzerland 
For Switzerland, a land-locked country in the heart of Europe, the situation after 
May 1940 was completely new and different from what it had experienced dur-
ing WWI, because the country was surrounded by one of the belligerent camps 
(the Axis Powers). This was a situation unprecedented since the end of the Na-
poleonic War. After the occupation of other small neutral states, Switzerland 
found itself in a unique position. Only Sweden had some similarities to Swit-
zerland in this respect.14  
Inner Blockade: This encirclement of Switzerland by the Axis Powers can be 
regarded as an inner blockade when compared to the outer blockade imposed by 
the Allies (discussed later). It had two aspects. On the one hand, it was a self-
blockade of sorts by Switzerland for the purpose of defence. On the other hand, 
it was a forced blockade from outside based on the Axis Powers’ strategy.  
Switzerland had many reasons to consider a self-blockade. The country was 
geared up for a possible German invasion and the influx of refugees. Its official 
plan of action in the event of German invasion was to abandon its major cities 
and retreat into a fortress in the heart of the Alps. After the surprisingly quick 
defeat of France, it became obvious that this kind of military resistance would 
be ineffective, though this widely shared perception was forgotten after the war. 
Nonetheless, armed neutrality and resistance against invasion were at the very 
core of Swiss neutrality; thus, self-blockade and border patrol were the logical 
consequences. 
The Axis Powers had their reasons to impose an external forced blockade on 
Switzerland. For Nazi Germany, mobilizing material resources in Switzerland 
was of little significance. Instead, utilizing neutral Switzerland as a gateway to the 
outside world, especially to maintain and expand relations with other neutral 
countries (including those outside Europe), was of primary interest.15 Securing 
|| 
14–M. Fritz, Swedish Adaptation to German Domination in the Second World War, in: Lund, 
Working for the New Order, pp. 129-140. 
15–ICE, Final Report. 
234   |   Takafumi Kurosawa  
 
trans-Alps transit was also important. For these purposes, the Axis Powers took 
control over the export of coal to Switzerland; they also took control over the 
border. Control over confidentiality was another reason driving the Axis.  
However, these voluntary and forced blockades did not mean that Switzer-
land was completely cut off from the outside world. Studies since the late 1990s 
showed that Switzerland communicated extensively with its neighbours during 
the war.16 This is not surprising given that the major economic centres of Swit-
zerland always had their economic hinterland beyond the border.17 During 
WWII, even when the border was closed occasionally, some of Swiss managers 
and engineers from the home factory in Switzerland were issued a Grenzkarte to 
visit the subsidiary factories in Germany.18 Though German control on cross-
border communications grossly intensified, geographical and personal proximi-
ty compensated for this to a certain extent.  
Some Swiss MNEs almost lost control over their German subsidiaries, espe-
cially where the German market had a large sales share in the whole group and 
in the case of armament-related industries as well. However, geographical prox-
imity remained decisive. Roche’s subsidiary in Berlin enjoyed an increase in sales 
thanks to exports to the German-dominant areas and due to military demand. In 
1941, two German executive officers of Roche Berlin started to act arbitrarily and 
attempted to take control of the subsidiaries in German-occupied areas. Howev-
er, the general manager of the Grenzach plant stood up for the Swiss headquar-
ters; Roche overcame this crisis by removing the two German directors.19 
Outer Blockade: The blockade on the Swiss border was not the only one for 
Switzerland. After the United Kingdom successfully retained air supremacy in 
the Battle of Britain and Germany abandoned its attempts at amphibious land-
ing in that country, continental Europe – which was under the hegemony of 
Nazi Germany – was externally blockaded by the Allies. The Axis fortified the 
shores against the Allies’ counterblow. In this way, the second blockade – the 
outer blockade –- was formed. Thus, neutral Switzerland was besieged by a 
double blockade.  
|| 
16–Wipf, Georg Fischer; Straumann/Wildmann, Schweizer Chemieunternehmen; Ruch/Rais-
Liechti/Peter, Geschäfte und Zwangsarbeit; ICE, Final Report; Kurosawa, Churitsukoku Suisu to 
Nachisumu. 
17–T. Kurosawa, Kindai Suisu Keizai no Keisei. Chiiki-Shyuken to Kou-Rain Chiiki no Sangyo 
Kakumei [The Formation of the Modern Swiss Economy: Regionalism and the Industrial Revo-
lution in the Hoch-Rhein Region], Kyoto 2002.  
18–Wipf, Georg Fischer, pp. 204-205. 
19–Peyer, Roche, p. 163. 
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The closure imposed by the outer blockade was also incomplete for several 
reasons. For Switzerland and Swiss MNEs, Nazi Germany’s counter-blockade 
had a relatively low impact because of the differences in attitude toward block-
ades or embargos, which reflected the asymmetric positions of the actors. 
With regard to Nazi Germany’s attitude toward this outer blockade, it is 
noteworthy that Swiss trade with the Allies was permitted to a certain extent. 
Germany issued the Geleitschein (a free navigation certificate) and allowed the 
Swiss fleet through the blockade barrier,20 though the path tended to be nar-
rower in the later phase of the war. Watch movement manufacturers in Swit-
zerland exported large quantities of mechanical time fuses to the United States, 
which were destined for military use.21 Nazi Germany used this generous policy 
for diplomatic clout over Switzerland, similar to its permission for the Gothen-
burg traffic that it used against Sweden.22 
The Allies’ equivalent of the Geleitschein was the allocation of trade quotas 
for raw materials, energy, and food for domestic consumption in Switzerland. 
The Allies viewed any supply of such materials to areas under German control 
with scepticism, as this could undermine their economic warfare. The Allies 
attempted to control all the inflow and outflow of materials and information 
across its blockade barrier. Switzerland and Swiss companies were the primary 
targets of their suspicion because of their historically strong ties with Germany. 
Finally, the communication costs associated with the trans-Atlantic sharing 
of knowledge were far higher than the costs for cross-border communication 
between Germany and Switzerland. The differences in cost stemmed not from 
the brutal characteristics of the dominant regime but from difficulties due to 
sheer geographical distance. 
However, the existence of other neutral countries (especially Spain and Por-
tugal) made the blockade incomplete.23 This loophole afforded by Portugal’s 
neutral status was exploited by Roche for communicating with the Western 
hemisphere.  
|| 
20–Ruch/Rais-Liechti/Peter, Geschäfte und Zwangsarbeit, p. 158.  
21–ICE, Final Report, pp. 200-201. 
22–Fritz, Swedish Adaptation, pp. 133-134. 
23–The Allies launched the Safehaven operation to prevent the flight of Nazis and their assets 
outside the blockade; see L.-M. Martin, Safehaven. The Allied Pursuit of Nazi Assets Abroad, New 
York 2007. 
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2.3  Asymmetric resources and strategy:  
Risks for MNEs in occupied and neutral countries 
The double blockade was an outcome of military necessity and the economic 
warfare tactics of the two belligerent camps. However, the resources that need-
ed to be mobilized and the geopolitical position in the world revealed a distinct 
asymmetry between the two camps. This was one of the reasons for the asym-
metric attitude toward MNEs. Although Nazi Germany dominated the European 
continent, from a global perspective, the area under Nazi-German control was 
surrounded by the Allies’ domain. With their abundant resources, depriving the 
enemy of supplies was a far bigger priority for the Allies than increasing their 
own resources.  
In this context, the Trading with the Enemy Act (of 1939 for the United King-
dom and of 1917 for the United States) became the Allies’ most important strate-
gic measure. During WWII, The Trading with the Enemy Act was applied not 
only to individuals and to companies that belonged to enemy nations, but also 
to those under the influence of the enemy.24 That is, all assets and economic 
activities in the Axis-occupied territories were classified as belonging to the 
enemy. This posed a serious problem to the globalized Swiss (and other Euro-
pean) MNEs. Even when the overseas assets of such MNEs were safeguarded 
from German invasion because of the spatial distance from Europe, if the parent 
company fell under German occupation, their overseas assets were deemed 
transferable to the Allies’ custody.25  
In the event of an invasion of Switzerland, there was almost no way the 
Swiss MNEs could safeguard their European businesses. The loss of control and 
ownership in the sphere of Nazi dominion and the introduction of a German 
custodian (Verwalter) for management were likely to happen, even if an imme-
diate surrender were to lessen material and human damages.26 Moreover, the 
|| 
24–Wubs, International Business, p. 80. 
25–To what extent the principle of the Trading with the Enemy Act was rational from the per-
spective of the Allies’ economic warfare is an open-ended question. However, the plans for 
postwar occupation and the policies for war reparations/compensation were still under discus-
sion at that time. In addition, the policy of capturing as much as possible was part of the Allies’ 
basic plan of containing the Axis Powers in the continent and depriving them of their power as 
soon as possible.  
26–Wubs, International Business, pp. 77-79, 84-87, 107-109. For an extreme case of immediate 
surrender and successful adjustment, see: J. Lund, Business Elite Networks in Denmark. Adjust-
ing to German Domination, in: Lund, Working for the New Order, pp. 115-128.  
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transfer of dividends and license fees to Europe from outside would be com-
pletely blocked. 
Therefore, for Swiss MNEs with large overseas shares in sales and assets, 
the handling of their overseas assets and communicating with the Allies 
through the outer blockade became the most crucial determinants of their sur-
vival for which they could be prepared. To avoid losing company property and 
human resources both in Europe as well as overseas, they needed to separate 
their assets in the two belligerent camps while maintaining de facto control over 
their overseas concerns. This was quite a challenge because they had to conceal 
their ownership and management structure from the Allies as well as the Axis 
Powers. It was not certain whether the Allies would in fact implement the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act or transfer the overseas assets of Swiss MNEs if Switzer-
land were to fall under Axis occupation.  
Historians now know that Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch MNE, encountered sim-
ilar problems because one of their headquarters was situated in the Nether-
lands; they received mild treatment at the hands of the Allies. However, even in 
the case of this half-British MNE, the eventual development was highly uncer-
tain and they introduced extremely complicated provisions for ownership trans-
fer by using layers of dummy companies and a trust scheme.27  
For Swiss MNEs, rather than the knowledge of their products, technologies 
and markets, the knowledge of their own organization became the most crucial 
factor for their survival in such a situation. 
3  Roche and WWII:  
Twin structure and trans-Atlantic communication  
3.1  Twin structure (Roche-Sapac), relocation to Panama, and 
emergence in the U.S. market 
In Roche’s case, its central provision for addressing the political risk was a spe-
cial holding and corporate structure with twin holding companies – Roche and 
Sapac. These companies were often called parallel companies (Parallelgesell-
schaften) and were initially formed between 1926 and 1927. 
Originally, this unique structure was introduced to cope with the increasing 
double taxation on the parent company and its subsidiaries as well as the seg-
|| 
27–Wubs, International Business, pp. 80-84. 
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mentation of the markets after the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire. The 
introduction of a new tax system and a flexible company law in Liechtenstein 
provided the conditions required for this organizational innovation.28 Later, this 
scheme started to serve the more important aims of addressing the increasing 
nationalism and avoiding the ultimate risk of confiscation by the belligerent 
authorities.29 
After the reorganization, the two holding companies, Roche and Sapac, 
formed the two cores of the ownership structure of the group. To start with, the 
Roche headquarters in Basel had directly owned the shares of its foreign sub-
sidiaries; after 1927, the shares were gradually transferred to Sapac, which was 
established in Liechtenstein. 
The Sapac share was deemed identical to the Roche share, and Roche 
shareholders were assigned a Sapac share for every Roche share they owned. 
The shares of the two companies were deemed inseparable. Roche shareholders 
received dividend from both companies; however, the Sapac shares were set 
aside for management by trust businesses, thereby precluding the possibility of 
direct disposal of shares by Roche shareholders.30 
The Roche group of businesses was now reorganized as unique identical 
twins, each independent from the other with no capital ties, but sharing the 
same shareholder composition by virtue of their articles of incorporation. 
In March 1938, just after Nazi Germany’s annexation of Austria, Roche relo-
cated Sapac from Liechtenstein (which came to share borders with the Third 
Reich) to Panama on the other side of the Atlantic. At the end of the same year, 
Roche’s president, Barell, came back from his business trip to the United States 
and asserted that their business focus should be on the West (by which he 
meant the United Kingdom, Anglo-America, and Latin America). Thus, the 
board decided to scale down the expansion plans for the research institute in 
Basel and assign these resources to the United Kingdom and the United States.31  
|| 
28–C.M. Merki, Wirtschaftswunder Liechtenstein. Die rasche Modernisierung einer kleinen 
Volkswirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert, Zurich 2007, pp. 136-150. 
29–For a discussion on the issue of corporate governance during the interwar period in Switzer-
land, see: M. Lüpold, Der Ausbau der „Festung Schweiz“: Aktienrecht und Corporate Govern-
ance in der Schweiz, 1881-1961, (Diss. Zurich) 2008. (Available online: http://www.ub.uni-
bas.ch/digi/a125/sachdok/2011/BAU_1_5587831.pdf, 07-09-2014). 
30–Roche Historical Archive, Documents Nr. Fa. 8.2 102300b, 14.01.1966: Nr. FR. 03-106047, Dr. 
A. von Sprecher, “Notiz zur Entwicklung der Roche-Statuten und des Verhaeltnisse Roche/ 
Sapac, 17.04.1963. 
31–Peyer, Roche, pp. 152, 177-178. 
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Roche’s financial director Fuchs talked about foreseeable risks as the reason 
for relocating Sapac from Liechtenstein to Panama.32 If the company had not 
relocated and Germany had annexed Liechtenstein, all of Sapac’s income would 
have been transferred to Germany. The payment of Sapac’s dividend to its 
shareholders would be blocked. Moreover, there was the risk that German au-
thorities might uncover their carefully guarded secret: that all the shares of 
Roche Germany were indirectly owned by Roche shareholders.  
However, after Roche’s relocation to Panama, the most serious managerial 
difficulty during the war was not control over the twin holding company, Sapac; 
rather, it was control over the U.S. subsidiary in Nutley. In the following section, 
we discuss the challenges posed by the desire for independence expressed by 
Elmer H. Bobst, the head of Roche’s U.S. subsidiary. 
3.2  Conflicts within the group:  
Challenges posed by American subsidiary and Bobst 
Roche’s U.S. business was almost half a century old when aspirations for making 
it independent were first expressed. Its penetration into the U.S. market had 
begun in 1895 with the establishment of a sales agency and moved into high 
gear with the founding of a subsidiary in 1905.33 In 1921, the U.S. subsidiary 
experienced some financial difficulties, but Barell managed to steer out of it by 
drastically reducing headcount, consolidating his authority by dispelling vet-
eran and family board members, and establishing governance by professional 
management. After these measures were initiated, the U.S. subsidiary made a V-
shaped recovery in revenue under the leadership of General Director Elmer H. 
Bobst, an American national. In fact, its revenue went on to surpass that of the 
German subsidiary in 1926 and eventually that of the Basel headquarters in 1929. 
In 1921, it kicked off full-fledged local production and relocated its production 
base from New York to Nutley, New Jersey in 1929. 
Roche’s U.S. subsidiary began to aspire for independence; this became 
known at the culmination of the unprecedented boom in the American economy 
and share prices. In July 1929, Bobst (the General Director of Roche US) visited 
Roche’s headquarters in Basel along with investment bankers from New York; 
their agenda was to propose shocking acquisition deals. One was for the acqui-
|| 
32–A. Fuchs, Aus meinem Berufsleben, Vol. II, pp. 140-141. 
33–Roche’s FDI in the United States was analyzed in M. Wilkins, The History of Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States 1914-1945, Cambridge 2004. 
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sition of the entire Roche group for USD 25 million; the other was for the acqui-
sition of Roche’s U.S. subsidiary for USD five million. The board of directors 
(Verwaltungsrat) in Basel immediately rejected these abrupt and presumptuous 
proposals from its U.S. subsidiary. Four months later, on October 24th 1929, 
stock prices at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) plunged, leading to the 
collapse of the world economy. In the middle of the Great Depression, the ac-
quisition proposals were forgotten. However, this did not discourage Bobst from 
pursuing his ambition of securing independence from the parent company in 
Switzerland.34 He remained tenacious and bided his time. After the rapid expan-
sion of their U.S. business, when the sales in the United States surpassed those 
of the Basel headquarters in 1936, he proposed the listing of the U.S. subsidiary 
on the NYSE.  
Bobst argued that this move was necessary to raise USD three million; this 
capital was required to finance the rapidly expanding U.S. business. He pressed 
that it was necessary to introduce American capital to Roche’s U.S. subsidiary, 
in which Roche (or more precisely, Roche’s shareholders) had 100 percent stake 
at that time (via Sapac in Panama), emphasizing the significance of becoming 
more localized amid the growing economic nationalism in the United States.35 
This knowledge about the market and the U.S. political environment was the 
very information that could not be verified without being on site.  
It was in this context that Roche’s president Barell decided to send Alfred J. 
Fuchs (1884-1958), the financial director of Roche, to the United States. Fuchs 
was Barell’s right-hand man.36 He had worked in Wall Street before joining 
Roche in 1926. He was in charge of the quinine business, which remained the 
most important segment for the company until the late 1920s. This business had 
a dominant international cartel of which Roche was a member. Fuchs always 
accompanied the president without any other companions to international 
meetings of the quinine cartel, which were convened every year at different 
locations. This experience forged a deep bond of trust between them. 
Fuchs travelled from Bremen by boat and arrived in New York in the early 
spring of 1936. Bobst tried to win him over with lavish entertainment. The Amer-
ican also took Fuchs to Hornblower & Weeks, an investment bank in Wall Street 
that was arranging the issuance of new shares as a candidate underwriter. Bobst 
argued that minority interest was not sufficient to achieve their goal. Fuchs’s 
|| 
34–Peyer, Roche, pp. 62, 73, 109, 115, 151. 
35–For a description of Fuchs’ experience in the United States in 1936, see: Fuchs, Aus meinem 
Berufsleben.  
36–Fuchs, Aus meinem Berufsleben, Vol. II, pp. 121-127. 
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counterproposal was the issuance of preferred shares with a reacquisition 
clause in lieu of the general stock (Stammaktien) with voting right; however, the 
local manager opposed this proposal. Upon his return to Basel, Fuchs reported 
directly to Barell. The information he brought was not limited to practical is-
sues. He also reported that Bobst had a personal ambition – to gain a large 
number of the newly issued shares. He expressed deep concern and alarm that 
this financial deal might endanger the unity of the group because it could split 
the interests of the Basel headquarters and its U.S. subsidiary.37 
Fuchs’s report was considered reliable because it was based on the hands-
on information that he had gathered through conversations and observations 
on site. It was also supported by his deep and systematic knowledge of the U.S. 
financial market and the company’s own organization, especially its financial 
structure. Based on Fuchs’s report, Bobst’s proposal was rejected once again.38 
3.3  Outbreak of WWII:  
Evacuation and legal arrangements (September 1939–
April 1940) 
On September 15th 1939, a fortnight after the outbreak of the world war,39 the 
Roche board approved a resolution sanctioning the relocation of its headquarters 
in case of an emergency (without specifying any date); this was meant as a securi-
ty measure in the event of a German invasion of Switzerland.40 Simultaneously, 
letters of resignation from all the board members were entrusted with the com-
pany’s attorney, and a document to invalidate the board members’ signatures 
was prepared, as security against possible aggression by the occupying force(s). 
Barell insisted on relocating the headquarters to the United States, but the 
other board members objected to his proposal. It was decided to relocate the 
headquarters to Lausanne instead.41 On November 3rd 1939, the board passed a 
|| 
37–Ibid., p. 127. 
38–Ibid., pp. 130-131. 
39–A few years before the German attack on Poland (around 1936-1938), a top executive at 
Roche had predicted that Germany would wage another war, based on information obtained 
through its international cartel network regarding Germany’s excessive stockpiling of quinine; 
Fuchs, Aus meinem Berufsleben, Vol. II, p. 133. 
40–See: Ibid., pp. 159-160. An automatic change in the place of registration to the location of 
the government in exile was made possible by an amendment made the next month: see Wipf, 
Georg Fischer, p. 144. 
41–Straumann/Wildmann, Schweizer Chemieunternehmen, pp. 179-180. 
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resolution to relocate the company’s registered address from Basel to Lausanne, 
with the possibility of moving it further to Paris, London, or even New York in 
the event of a more imminent threat. At that stage, the memory of WWI and 
especially the experience of trench warfare, was still dominant. Therefore, a 
nominal relocation to Lausanne was considered meaningful, rational, and suffi-
cient. After the division of Poland during the course of the peculiar war, the plan 
to evacuate to Lausanne was suspended and the business continued to operate 
out of Basel.42 During this period (before Operation Weserübung was launched 
on April 9th 1940 in the North), Barell and Fuchs travelled to Amsterdam and 
Brussels for the annual meeting of the quinine cartel. 
During this period of anxiety and temporary relief, Roche pressed ahead with 
additional preparations for a war. The ownership of Roche UK was transferred 
from the Basel headquarters to Sapac, which was now located in Panama City. 
In October 1940, Fuchs visited London for the legal transfer of ownership.43 The 
U.K. visa application process was tedious; finally, the British Consulate issued 
Fuchs a visa with a fixed departure date. Fuchs travelled to Boulogne via Paris 
and took a boat across the English Channel. In the United Kingdom, Swiss Bank 
Corporation and Nadir Corporation in Panama City handled the formalities.44 
3.4  Second phase of WWII:  
Besieged Switzerland and flight of Barell to the United 
States (April/May 1940) 
Six months after the outbreak of WWII, the situation changed dramatically and 
abruptly. On April 9th 1940, Operation Weserübung opened up a new front in the 
North. In a month, the German invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Lux-
emburg as well as the Battle of France (May 10th 1940) changed the entire geo-
political landscape of Europe. Following Italy’s declaration of war (June 10th 
1940) against the Allies and the surrender of France (June 22nd 1940), Switzer-
land was besieged by the Axis Powers.  
This prompted the evacuation of citizens from the northern border area to-
ward the south of the country. As early as May, Barell declared that the time had 
|| 
42–Ibid., pp. 179-180. 
43–Fuchs, Aus meinem Berufsleben, Vol. II, pp. 161-163. 
44–The Nadir Corporation in Panama was founded by Roche, and its capital was owned by 
Sapac. This dummy company was also used for gold transactions in London, which were ar-
ranged to address the worsening foreign exchange situation; see Ibid., pp. 97-106.  
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come to evacuate from Basel, although his fellow directors (members of Direk-
tionsausschuss, the executive officers) did not welcome this decision. Roche 
eventually arranged an office at the Savoy Hotel in Lausanne, stockpiled a cer-
tain amount of material in a warehouse in Lausanne, and reserved a factory.45 
However, this limited evacuation plan was far from satisfying for Barell who 
had a Jewish wife and had lived under house arrest in Berlin during WWI. He 
had frequent telephone calls with Bobst regarding this issue, which convinced 
him to immigrate to the United States. On May 21st 1940, Barell nominated new 
executive officers; this decision was approved by the board of directors (Verwal-
tungsrat) that afternoon. Fuchs retained his position as executive officer. Barell 
left for Genoa immediately and travelled further to New York, accompanied by 
his family.46 After his departure, the business operations on the European Conti-
nent were executed by a daily conference involving the board members who 
remained in Basel. Important decisions were made in the weekly board meeting 
with the consent of Brugger, a board member of Basler Handelsbank and Barell’s 
official proxy.  
Barell found a base for himself in the U.S. subsidiary in Nutley. Bobst, the 
head of the Nutley operations, had good tactics. Barell, his family, and even his 
housemaid started their life in exile in Bobst’s residence. Moreover, his new 
office was opened across from Bobst’s office in Nutley.  
Barell’s priority was to establish communication with Roche’s subsidiaries 
in the Western hemisphere and the Far East. An unauthorized plan was pursued 
to transform Nutley from a mere U.S. headquarters to the global centre for all 
overseas subsidiaries – one that would provide products, technical assistance, 
and managerial instructions for all the overseas subsidiaries. As part of this 
process, a foreign division was established at Nutley. A number of managers 
and researchers were transferred to the United States starting from the fall of 
1940 all through the following year. These measures had a clear objective. Most of 
the subsidiaries and agencies within the Allies’ sphere of influence came under 
the supervision of Nutley, and it became the de facto global headquarters.47 
|| 
45–This preparation continued through mid-June; however, it was not really utilized after a 
period of ostensible stabilization. Widespread defeatism could explain this return to a business 
as usual mode of working. 
46–Of the six executive officers located in Basel, two others travelled to the United States 
during the war; see Peyer, Roche, pp. 158-159. 
47–In this situation, the general meeting of the shareholders of Sapac, which was now regis-
tered in Panama, was held in the office of Roche’s U.S. subsidiary located in Nutley, New Jer-
sey; see Roche Historical Archive: Box Nr. PAE.2. BAE_101622_I XIII, Sapac Corporation II. Offiz. 
Correspondence Shareholding. Documents sent from Sapac Corporation, 20 Avenida A, Pana-
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Thus, Roche gradually transitioned to a twin management structure (Nutley-
Basel) similar to the twin ownership structure (Panama City-Basel) in order to 
cope with the division of the market according to the two spheres of influence.48 
3.5  Telecommunications across the Atlantic during WWII 
It would be interesting to explore how Roche organized communication across 
the Atlantic. This communication can be partially reproduced using the materi-
als preserved at the Roche Historical Archive.49 
Since the beginning of the double blockade, overseas communication was 
carried out using telecommunications tools like the post, telegraph, and tele-
phone. At the same time, documents and memoirs were often entrusted to a 
third party. In addition, business trips and migrations of executives and other 
staff members also played important roles.  
All official correspondence by telegram and postal mail were assigned a se-
rial number every year to ensure that nothing was lost during transmission. All 
communications referred to this serial number together with the date of dis-
patch, in order to avoid misunderstanding. Postal mail was usually duplicated 
and the two copies were sent separately. The communication of detailed infor-
mation with rich nuances mainly occurred via post.50 
The use of telegrams was also quite frequent; in this case, the messages were 
normally very short (ranging from 20 to 100 words) and used simple language. 
Almost all the telegrams were written in English. Roche never used codes or 
|| 
ma City to “Sirs”, c/o Dr. E. C. Barell No. 2 East 86th Street, New York 28, New York, dated 
12.10.1944 and 12.04.1945. 
48–Between September 1939 and December 1941, there was a third sphere outside the outer 
blockade consisting of the neutral, non-belligerent, and straddling countries (typically Latin 
American countries). It was both economically as well as strategically important for the other 
two camps. For Roche, these countries were important as markets and as venues to carry out 
the complicated schemes for the protection of its interests (such as Panama). However, access 
to these regions was largely controlled by the Allies.  
49–Roche Historical Archive, Document Nr. PE. 2. BAE 101638. Korrespondenz A. Fuchs mit 
Herrn D. Barell; Document Nr. PE. 2. BAE 101622 Akten Dr. Barell, Aufenthalt in Nutley 1940-1946; 
Document Nr. LG. US-101979. 17 Ordner Korrespondenz mit Nutley von 1940 bis 1952. 
50–Peyer, Roche, pp. 159-160; Roche Historical Archive, Document Nr. PE. 2. BAE 10638, a-f., 
Korrespondenz A. Fuchs mit Barell and Document Nr. PE. 2. BAE 10625, 1-11. 
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ciphers in any of these communications.51 This was presumably because they 
did not wish to attract needless attention from the Allies.52 Roche had been 
questioned by the American and British Consuls in Basel about a few seemingly 
dubious telegrams that were related to its trade with its German subsidiary. This 
incident left a strong impression on the Roche executives; they realized how 
well organized the Allies’ telegram censorship system was.53 Roche was able to 
convince the Allies that it was just a groundless allegation made by its competi-
tors, and that the group as a whole had far stronger commitments to the Allies 
than it had to the Axis. In order to avoid being blacklisted, being open was 
deemed crucial.54 
3.6  Roche’s secret group structure and the Allies’ perception 
of the group structure 
Concerning the company’s most delicate secret, i.e. the holding structure of the 
Roche group (twin structure, complicated ownership, and trust schemes), only 
scattered and indirect information could be found among the various corre-
spondences. Almost all the overseas companies that were founded either di-
rectly or indirectly by Roche appeared to be independent companies. Communi-
cations with Icaza (a law office in Panama) and with Nadir Corporation (the 
dummy company that was also in Panama) were such examples. Without fo-
cused attention on the issue and a systematic reconstruction of the available, 
scattered information (which was only possible with a retrospective overview 
half a century later), it was almost impossible to pin down the ownership and 
management structure of the Roche group.  
|| 
51–For a discussion of the role of telegrams in WWII and security issues in general, see: D.H. 
Headrick, The Invisible Weapon. Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945, 
New York 1991, pp. 214-274. 
52–In the case of Georg Fischer, which had subsidiaries in Germany and in the United King-
dom, the language of correspondence with the U.K. subsidiaries was changed from German to 
English after the war broke out. Additionally, the postal mail to its Swiss headquarters was not 
addressed to the company office but to the personal address of the directors. These measures 
were adopted to steer clear of the Allies’ mistrust and to avoid being blacklisted; seeWipf, 
Georg Fischer, p. 496. 
53–Fuchs, Aus meinem Berufsleben, Vol. II, pp. 307-314. 
54–Roche often invited American and British diplomats to its factories. Georg Fischer also 
followed this practice; see Wipf, Georg Fischer, pp. 116-122.  
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As for the existing core structure of the group with the twin relationship  
between Roche and Sapac, connected by identical shareholders who legally had 
no official ties, it can be assumed that U.S. authorities were aware of it to a cer-
tain degree. However, the rest of the complicated protective measures (in antici-
pation of a possible German occupation of Switzerland) and the transactions 
and trust schemes among the various dummy companies were kept secret despite 
the suspicion and tenacious queries of the FBI and other American authorities.55 
Roche succeeded in evading scrutiny for multiple reasons. Firstly, the focus 
of the U.S. authorities was on national security and possible cloaking by the 
Germans. Since the shares of Roche and Sapac were not listed and were mostly 
Swiss-owned, there was not much to hide, theoretically.56 
Secondly, as long as there was no pro forma illegality, what was more im-
portant was whether the group was really committed to the Allies and if it was 
ready to cooperate. Thirdly, as for pro forma legality, Roche’s group structure was 
not illegal; thus, there was no ground for compulsory investigation. Fourthly, 
Switzerland was eventually spared from German occupation, and the prear-
ranged set-up was not fully mobilized. Fifthly, in these situations, the suspicion 
about Roche’s activities focused on the company’s involvement in cartels and 
tax evasion; the authorities focused on the possibility of imposing taxes on the 
transfer of dividends from its U.S. subsidiary to Sapac in Panama.57 
|| 
55–How exactly Roche succeeded in doing this is beyond the scope of this paper; this would 
need to be taken up in future research.  
56–Since Roche’s shares were bearer shares, that is, the shareholders were by definition anon-
ymous, it was not easy for the company to prove this fact. Eventually, the U.S. authorities froze 
U.S. Roche’s transfer of dividends to its foreign shareholders. Thus began a long-lasting litiga-
tion against the U.S. authorities. Roche kept its shareholder composition secret until the end of 
WWI. After the war, the company convinced the authorities about the facts and succeeded in 
getting the freeze lifted; Fuchs, Aus meinem Berufsleben, Vol. II, pp. 293-297. When the U.S. 
authorities scrutinized Roche’s assets for unblocking the company’s frozen assets held in 
neutral countries, they accepted the Swiss statement, according to which 78 percent of the 
shares of the parent Roche company was held in Switzerland and less than one percent was in 
Germany and Japan; Wilkins, History of Foreign Investment, p. 572. 
57–When a foreign subsidiary’s business in the United States surpassed half that of the parent 
company, the U.S. tax authority tried to levy taxes on the profits of the U.S. subsidiary as well 
as those of the parent company in another country. This policy resulted in a long-lasting litiga-
tion in the United States; this motivated Roche to implement a fundamental measure for avoid-
ing such taxation by reorganizing its distribution network in South America after WWII; Fuchs, 
Aus meinem Berufsleben, Vol. II, pp. 326-347. 
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3.7  Expansion of the U.S. business and ambition to 
Americanize Roche US 
During WWII, Roche’s U.S. business dramatically expanded thanks to its strate-
gic shift toward the West and the increased demand for vitamin products and 
penicillin, the two mainstays of its business since the early 1940s. The staffing 
level at its U.S. subsidiary increased from 669 in 1940 to 2,000 in 1945, surpas-
sing that of the Basel headquarters, which grew from 800 to 1,200 during the 
same period.58 In 1935, the revenue contributions of the Swiss headquarters, the 
U.S. subsidiary, and the German subsidiary to the group revenue were a little 
less than 20 percent each. The American revenue grew 17 times by 1943, consti-
tuting a majority of the group’s revenues.59 Most of the pharmaceutical products 
were produced in the United States even before the war; during the war, the 
research and development (R&D) function was beefed up to position the U.S. 
subsidiary as the group’s largest research base. Roche grew to be the biggest 
provider of vitamins to the Allies during the war.60 The company started the 
production of penicillin in 1943 at the request of the U.S. administration. 
However, this rapid expansion of the American business destabilized the 
management structure of the group.61 In the summer of 1940, taking advantage 
of his perceived friendship with Barell (who was in a weak state of mind, which 
was common to people in exile), Bobst managed to convince him that American 
capital was necessary for the survival and expansion of Roche’s business inter-
ests in the United States.62 To Fuchs’ astonishment, the executive committee 
|| 
58–Peyer, Roche, p. 159. 
59–Straumann/Wildmann, Schweizer Chemieunternehmen, p. 181. 
60–The U.K. government introduced the compulsory addition of vitamins to white bread to 
prevent malnutrition of their citizens during WWII. Roche took a risk and invested in a large-
scale vitamin factory; soon, it became the main supplier of vitamins as a food additive; Peyer, 
Roche, pp. 293-303. 
61–Fuchs, Aus meinem Berufsleben, Vol. II, p. 159.  
62 The U.S. subsidiary’s ambition for independence was closely linked to Bobst’s personal 
greed. During the war, he started to use the title of Vice President without permission from 
Basel; subsequently, he gained the official title of President by putting pressure on the parent 
company, arguing that it was necessary to display American patriotism and to dispel scepti-
cism toward Switzerland. Moreover, he added an unusual clause in his employment contract: 
he would receive 5 percent of the company’s corporate pre-tax income as annual compensa-
tion, along with his already high salary. During WWII, the tax rate on corporate income was 
increased up to 80 percent. Therefore, Bobst’s annual compensation could translate to an 
exorbitant amount compared to what Roche US paid as dividend to its parent company. Barell 
248   |   Takafumi Kurosawa  
 
and the board of directors in Basel approved of this project. In Basel, with the 
exception of the financial director, none of the managers had the knowledge or 
the information required to make a sound judgment regarding this matter. Ac-
cess to objective information about the political situation in the United States, 
especially about public opinion and the authorities’ criteria, was quite limited 
in Switzerland. The sense of uncertainty about Nazi-dominated Europe might 
have had a role to play in this context. 
To realize this project, the legal agreement between Roche Basel and Roche 
US concerning the rights and obligations (including royalties) needed to be 
redefined. This was a complicated matter and the group’s president sought a 
one-to-one meeting with his right-hand man to get a second opinion. Thus, 
Fuchs ventured another journey across the Atlantic.  
3.8  Fuchs’s first wartime journey to the United States  
(late September–December 1940) 
In this section, we follow Fuchs’ path to the United States in the summer of 
1940, one year after the outbreak of WWII. His aim was to understand the U.S. 
listing project. Switzerland was already besieged by the Axis Powers. Thus, his 
mission was to break through the double blockade and build a bridge between 
Roche’s two headquarters. 
Despite mobilizing all the organizational capabilities of the large MNE, 
Fuchs’ travel was riddled with difficulties. The process of obtaining a U.S. visa 
was not complicated because the United States was not yet involved in the war. 
However, getting transit visas for France, Spain, and Portugal were wearying 
processes. After great struggle, Fuchs finally got the necessary visas. Addition-
ally, he offered to work as a diplomatic courier connecting Bern with Washing-
ton D.C. and New York. Although the Swiss Foreign Ministry (Politisches De-
partment) approved of his request, it did not issue him a diplomatic passport; 
instead, he was simply given a letter of recommendation testifying that he was 
carrying parcels for the Swiss diplomatic establishments in the United States.63 
At the end of September 1940, Fuchs departed from Genève. He took the on-
ly loophole available for civilian travellers - the route via Lisbon. Since the rail-
way system in France was not functioning, he took a bus connecting Genève 
|| 
brushed aside Fuchs’s sharp criticism of this issue and argued that changing his contract 
during the war would not be ideal; Fuchs, Aus meinem Berufsleben, Vol. II, pp. 246-249). 
63–Ibid., pp. 185-187. 
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and Barcelona, which was operated by a Swiss company. His travel through 
southern France was filled with hardship. At the border between France and 
Spain, he was told that the border was closed off. The passengers of the bus 
were informed that because Portugal had closed its borders, Spain was unwill-
ing to risk allowing transit travellers into their territory. Only employees of 
companies with a residence permit for Spain were exempt from this general 
measure; Fuchs forced his way through the border claiming that he was quali-
fied to be in this category. At the immigration office on the Spanish side, the 
letter issued by the Swiss foreign ministry helped him.64 
The journey from the French-Spanish border to Barcelona was also ex-
hausting. He took a train from Barcelona to Madrid. The Spanish-Portuguese 
border was open. In Lisbon, Roche Portugal’s staff managed to book him a hotel 
room. Since Lisbon was the sole way out to America and a dead end in Europe, 
the city was full of refugees and travellers.65 
In Lisbon, Fuchs received a telegram informing him about Barell’s illness. 
He was instructed to go back to Basel, but Fuchs decided to continue his  
journey. He took a flight from Lisbon to New York, with transfers at Azores and 
Bermuda. At the immigration counter in Bermuda, holders of diplomatic courier 
were treated very favourably.66 
In the United States, Fuchs postponed his meeting with Barell (since the  
latter was sick) and made a transcontinental journey. When Fuchs finally met 
Barell, he was shocked by how the latter had weakened. After a while, Barell 
recovered to an extent and was discharged from hospital; he returned to his 
room in Bobst’s house. Soon, a meeting was held to discuss the listing of the 
U.S. subsidiary on the NYSE. 
The meeting in Bobst’s private house was attended by five representatives 
of the company (including Barell, Bobst, and Fuchs); it turned out to be a heat-
ed discussion that lasted over ten days.67 At the beginning of the meeting, Barell 
revealed that the U.S. subsidiary’s stocks would be listed on the NYSE and that 
negotiations with Hornblower & Weeks, the managing underwriter, were in 
progress. Barell quite convinced about the necessity of this project. The other 
directors who had moved from Basel also supported the plan; even the Basel 
headquarters had notified its basic endorsement, leaving Fuchs as the sole 
voice of opposition. During the discussion, Bobst spoke eloquently, stressing 
|| 
64–Ibid., pp. 187-194. 
65–Ibid., pp. 154-201. 
66–Ibid., pp. 204-211. 
67–Ibid., pp. 217-223. 
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how Europe was in chaos and in deep political, economic, and financial difficul-
ties, that all the directors in exile in America as well as Roche’s shareholders 
should appreciate the fact that Americans were offering a lifeboat to save a large 
part of the Roche group, and that Roche could reward this support by offering 
the American public a chance to participate in Roche’s profits. 
Fuchs could not possibly buy this argument. He was apprehensive about 
the fundamental restructuring of the group that would be necessitated by the 
listing and was hesitant to accept the idea that the United States was a safe zone 
(i.e. it was free from the war). Additionally, there were concerns about the issue 
price. These concerns were based on the strong sense of uncertainty about the 
future; the concerns also involved the intellectual assets and human resources 
that would need to be transferred from Basel. Fuchs felt that the proposed price 
did not reflect the value of such assets. To him, this listing seemed to be a mere 
asset transfer to the United States that would result in distinct disadvantages to 
the existing shareholders.  
At the same time, the conditions for supply from Nutley to the Western hem-
isphere and the Far East formed the focal point of the discussion. Bobst dis-
closed that Nutley was already providing technical advice and semi-manu-
factured products to Roche’s subsidiaries in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and 
Montreal, and that it was getting payments for these products and services. 
Bobst argued that these relationships were good enough reasons to make Roche 
US the owner of these three companies in the Western hemisphere.68 
The news of Nutley’s progress in these matters was a great shock to the fi-
nancial director. The truth was that Bobst had exploited Barell’s illness and had 
gone behind the parent company’s back. Roche Basel was doing its best to sepa-
rate ownership from the intellectual property rights and supply relations with 
its subsidiaries, which was the very reason for Sapac’s existence. However, the 
U.S. subsidiary had casually stepped over the headquarters’ carefully drawn 
line for minimizing political risks and had even dared to try to extend it to the 
direct ownership relations. If Roche US were to play the same function as the 
holding company Sapac did, it would necessitate a dangerous fundamental 
change to the group structure. 
Such an expansion of Nutley’s functions was also not reflected in the pro-
posed issuing price, and it would cause damage to the company’s existing 
shareholders. If the decision to transfer the ownership of the Latin American 
and Canadian subsidiaries from Sapac to Roche US had been made after the IPO 
at the NYSE, this plan could still have been cancelled. However, once this plan 
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was included in the listing prospectus and the new shareholders purchased the 
discounted new shares, it would be impossible to cancel the plan.  
After ten days of debate and Fuchs’ rejection of Barell’s compromise (a  
proposal that included 51 percent shareholding for Roche US in those three 
companies), the discussion came to a deadlock. As Bobst began his favourite 
story about the refugees who sought sanctuary under the aegis of the Stars and 
Stripes, Fuchs interrupted him: “You seem to be convinced that nothing will 
change in the United States, and that economic and financial difficulties in 
Switzerland will persist. But haven’t you ever imagined a totally opposite situa-
tion, in which the United States will be drawn into the war, taxes will be raised, 
and so all the bases of your calculations will be overturned? If this were to hap-
pen, would you take full responsibility for the consequences?”69 With nobody 
answering this question, the discussion ended.  
The next day, Fuchs’ defeat became obvious when the telegram to be sent to 
Basel was drafted; the basic idea of Barell’s compromise was maintained in this 
communication. Fuchs gave up opposing it and signed the communication 
while keeping alive the faint hope that the board in Basel would pay attention to 
the disagreement that he had voiced. He prepared for the issuance of shares and 
worked on this communication over the weeks that followed. 
In late November 1940, Fuchs left the United States. In Bermuda, his lug-
gage (including the diplomatic documents and all the documents about the 
listing of the U.S. subsidiary) was inspected. The journey from Lisbon back to 
Basel was again tiresome.70 
3.9  A game-changing phone Call:  
Last-minute volte-face at midnight (Spring 1941) 
After Fuchs’ return to Basel, there was no notable news on the progress of the 
listing project. The listing prospectus was printed but it was not sent to Basel. 
Fuchs had to obtain it privately from a friend who worked for a bank in Basel. 
He was shocked to find the clause that allowed five percent annual compensa-
tion for Bobst. Instead of a single-year contract, Bobst’s position was guaran-
teed for five years. He had convinced Barell that such a stable status of the com-
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pany’s president (who had to be an American national) was indispensable for 
the success of the listing project.71 
However, the game was not over yet. In the spring of 1941, during the final 
stages of the listing process, Emil Barell made an international call to Fuchs.72 
This took Fuchs by surprise because he was usually given prior notice about 
international phone calls. This time, Fuchs received a call at midnight without 
any advance information. Barell was in deep dilemma and had trouble making 
up his mind; he wanted Fuchs’ advice. This was unlike Barell, who was usually 
authoritarian toward his subordinates. The group president confessed that the 
issuing of shares was running into trouble because of certain demands made by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In its hearing, the SEC had 
requested him to disclose all information about the Roche group’s structure.73 
The SEC demanded that he take responsibility for this information not as Presi-
dent of Roche Basel but as an individual. Barell voiced his anxiety about the 
project for the first time. He had begun to feel that his American colleagues were 
serving their own interests, not those of the Roche group at large.  
Fuchs did not let this precious opportunity pass. He emphasized that the 
war had just begun and that nobody knew what would happen next. A personal 
guarantee would be extremely precarious, given the possibility of Nazi Ger-
many’s occupation of Switzerland and of America engaging in the war. In short, 
he expressed the Swiss view of the situation. Barell found his argument con-
vincing and appreciated his advice. Thus, the painstakingly prepared listing 
project was abruptly dropped overnight. 
This episode of the final decision regarding the listing of stocks on the NYSE 
is an outstanding example of the power of the real-time, nuanced, and emotion-
charged communications that are possible over the phone. This single long-
distance call did cost the company a few thousand francs, but it saved the integ-
rity of the group.74  
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Bobst’s house into an apartment facing Central Park.  
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3.10  Financial director Fuchs’ second wartime journey to  
  the United States (June–September 1942) 
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent American entry 
into the war in December 1941, Barell called Fuchs to the United States once 
again.75 He wanted to have an intensive discussion with him, especially given 
the new situation.  
However, at that stage, it was already impossible to obtain a U.S. visa just 
for business. Barell proposed to meet Fuchs in Havana, Cuba, while enjoying a 
family holiday there. Fuchs asked the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inter-
vene and managed to get a visa for Cuba. However, Barell’s re-entry into the 
United States after his visit to Havana was not guaranteed. Therefore, this plan 
was aborted. 
Despite these setbacks, Fuchs’ second wartime trip across the Atlantic fol-
lowed in a few months. Barell informed his subordinate that the situation was 
becoming increasingly pressing. Fuchs mobilized all his connections. The 
American Consul in Basel (who was friends with Fuchs and his family) prom-
ised to do his best, but the outcome was uncertain. Consultations with the Swiss 
government benefited Fuchs. At that time, the Swiss Bankers’ Association 
(Schweizerische Bankiervereingung) was asking the Swiss federal government for 
diplomatic intervention in the matter of securities and other goods that had 
been confiscated by the British authorities in Bermuda. The U.K. office in Ber-
muda was in charge of censorship in the Atlantic. The office was also a compe-
tent authority as the judicial body for all goods confiscated during the war in 
that region. Fuchs requested his government and the Swiss Bankers’ Associa-
tion to allow him to function as a Swiss diplomat to handle this issue, for which 
a negotiation with the U.S. authorities in New York was indispensable. This 
proposal worked out and he was issued a diplomatic passport; he obtained a 
U.S. visa as well as visas for all the transit countries.76 
On June 6th 1942, Fuchs opened a bottle of champagne at Hotel Drei König, 
the residence of the American Consul. The Consul had arranged a farewell din-
ner for Fuchs. The host entrusted Fuchs with a personal letter to his daughter 
and advised him to watch out for tails planted by the American authorities;  
he also told him to keep all necessary documents ready to avoid any miscom-
munication in the event of an interrogation. He dropped by at the Nestlé head-
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quarters in Vevey, where he was asked to visit Nestlé’s president, Eduard  
Müller, who had moved to a suburb of New York (Stamford/ Connecticut).77 
Though his second journey during the war was also tiresome, Fuchs 
reached the United States in a few weeks. He took a train from Genève to the 
Spanish border, and further to Madrid, and finally took an airplane to Lisbon. 
There, he was informed by an airline staff member that his name was on the 
American blacklist; therefore, he was not allowed to board the flight. After con-
tacting the Swiss authorities, it became clear that he had been mistaken for a 
different person on the blacklist with the identical name. From Lisbon, he trav-
elled further the same way as he did during his previous visit. The U.K. author-
ity in Bermuda interrogated him but did not prevent him travelling further. 
Later, he learned that Bobst had tried to block his journey. The battle between 
Fuchs and Bobst, in which the latter leveraged all his American connections, 
had begun even before Fuchs’ arrival in New York. 
In New York, Fuchs spent a lot of time with Barell. He consulted with sev-
eral Wall Street law firms about the possibility of revoking Bobst’s employment 
contract. However, this effort proved futile. An open conflict with Bobst seemed 
too risky because of the nationalistic atmosphere after the U.S. engagement in 
the war. Fuchs hammered out a lucrative employment condition for Bobst, 
which the latter accepted. Although it cost the company a lot, both parties stood 
to gain from reduced tax payment. Soon after this, Bobst left Roche US; he re-
tained the right to receive substantial remuneration as an external advisor.78 At 
any rate, his leaving the company finally removed the risk of break-up that the 
group had faced. 79 
4  Conclusion 
What are the implications that can be derived from the case dealt with in this 
study? Firstly, the political situation and military events of that time resulted in 
higher uncertainty than the economic events did; therefore, political events 
|| 
77–Roche and Nestlé had a close business relationship thanks to food products with vitamin 
additives. Both companies had created twin corporate and business organizations with the 
same objectives; Kurosawa/Wubs, Swiss and (Anglo)-Dutch Multinationals. 
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were recognized as the more fundamental risk factors to the organization, and 
these determined the organization’s survival strategy. 
Secondly, regardless of the double blockade, intensive communication was 
maintained between the two hubs of the Roche group that were separated by 
the blockade. The various means of communication had their own unique ad-
vantages and drawbacks. Telegrams were fast but could carry only limited 
amounts of information; therefore, this means was not suitable for conveying 
subtle nuances or for extended communication. Complicated information, dif-
ferent reports, and deeds/certificates were sent by postal mail but this mode of 
communication took time; during the war, there were frequent delays and 
sometimes, no delivery was made, rendering this mode of communication un-
trustworthy. Both modes of communication were subject to interception and 
censorship by the two warring camps. Telephone communication was costly but 
allowed real time conversations that could convey subtle nuances. Telephone 
conversations could also be intercepted, but the risk was relatively less due to 
constraints in the recording methods of the time. Thus, the telephone was uti-
lized as a relatively safe means of communication.  
Thirdly, telecommunication itself was not a sufficient means for the sharing 
of information and knowledge that were indispensable for the survival strategy 
of the organization. It led to the hollowing out of the ownership of the Roche’s 
U.S. subsidiary and subsequent threats to Roche’s governance and management, 
despite the president and a number of high-ranking executives travelling from 
the headquarters to the United States to contain the risks. (Ironically, their arri-
val worsened the crisis in a way.) Under these circumstances, face-to-face nego-
tiations with less time delays and asymmetries in information played a key role. 
Fourthly, the differences in perceptions and strategies among geographically 
separated subsidiaries stemmed not only from the clash of interests among the 
organizations and individuals but also from the asymmetry of information and 
knowledge that each of them possessed. Such asymmetries were further ampli-
fied by the asymmetry in perception based on prior experiences as well as by 
differences in the envisioned future from a political perspective and the desirable 
future image of the company.80  
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Lastly, the limitations of this paper and issues still to be explored should be 
mentioned. The paper traced the perceptions and actions of people who chal-
lenged the double blockade, but could not verify their rationales by using per-
sonal memos or records by third parties, as only those kept by Roche were ac-
cessed. In particular, the effectiveness and motivation of its intricate scheme 
concerning voting rights and ownership should be further examined by using 
the historical archives of the Allied authorities. 
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American public. For him, the listing on the NYSE was vital for safeguarding Roche’s interest 
(which is where he differed from Fuchs). Considering how Roche’s business and autonomy in 
Europe were doomed, the Americanization of Roche’s ownership was deemed the best safe-
guard against the political risks of that time. However, even by this argument (which sounds 
ironically closer to the logic of stakeholder value or managerial capitalism), the justification for 
the unwilling transfer of (family) ownership from the existing shareholders to the new owners 
in the United States was rather weak, given that private property should be respected. Thus, 
the legitimacy of the listing project depended on political and ethical values – the perception of 
a desirable future. In this respect, the views of the two men were in fundamental conflict, 
which resulted in different ways of thinking and distinct ideas about desirable actions. 
